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While the natural resource curse has been exhaustively examined for its impact on growth (see inter alia 
Sachs and Warner 2001, Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2008, van der Ploeg 2011, Avalos et al. 2015, and 
Havranek et al. 2016), the linkages between resource abundance and income inequality are thinner on 
the ground. Theoretically, the effects of resource abundance on inequality are highly ambiguous. In the 
first instance, the structure of the economy matters, as capital-intensive resource sectors can draw 
scarce capital from manufacturing, retarding industrialization and leading directly to widening inequality 
(Leamer et al. 1999). Along these lines, resource abundance, by fostering dependence on primary 
exports, can also halt diversified industrialization (i.e. manufacturing not associated with resources) and 
urbanization, both processes which contribute to lower inequality (Auty 2001).  
 
On the other hand, resource abundance, as a source of wealth for existing generations, may be able to 
lower inequality in the short- and medium-term. By providing a ready-made industry for a country, one 
that is labor-intensive, natural resource discoveries may help to raise low-skilled workers out of poverty 
and flatten a country’s income distribution. At the same time, there may be spatial effects resulting 
from a resource discovery, as urban centers located closer to the discovery can take on the attributes of 
a “boom town,” drawing workers and investors from elsewhere to participate in the bonanza (Eduful 
and Hooper 2015).  
 
It would appear that the crucial mechanism for transforming resource abundance into lower levels of 
inequality, allowing for the dispersal of benefits and minimization of costs, would necessarily be a 
country’s institutions, and in particular its political institutions. This reality has been touched upon in 
many papers examining the political economy of the resource curse: for example, as Parcero and 
Papyrakis (2016) note, resource abundance can result in lower inequality if the (political) mechanisms 
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exist for redistribution of resource rents to broad swathes of society. Similarly, much of the economics 
and political science literature acknowledges the counterfactual, namely that where these distribution 
mechanisms are absent - for example if only a small and politically-connected class can reap the benefits 
of a resource discovery - it is much more likely that inequality will become entrenched or exacerbated. 
Indeed, it is likely in the interest of ruling elites to keep resource rents concentrated for their own 
benefit, a strategy which has long-term deleterious effects for the diversification of the economy and, by 
extension, income inequality (Wiig and Kolstad 2012). 
 
The explicit nature of how specific political institutions mediate resources, and thus affect income 
inequality, remains an area which has been incorporated into conceptual frameworks only on a 
peripheral basis. Much like the broader resource curse framework, there has instead been a focus on 
the effect of political institutions on economic growth in the presence of natural resources (Mehlum et 
al. 2006), finding either that democracy writ large has little effect on growth in resource-abundant 
economies (Ross 1999, Kolstad 2009), poor political institutions can encourage rent-seeking and thus 
retard growth (Atkinson and Hamilton 2003) while good political institutions can prevent such behavior 
(Brunnschweiler 2008), or that the type of political ordering is crucial in determining the effect of 
natural resources (Andersen and Aslaksen 2008). Similarly, the literature focusing on the effects of 
institutions on inequality have tended to avoid incorporating the idea of resource booms, either noting 
how institutions and inequality influence each other (Chong and Gradstein 2007) or focusing on 
institutional effectiveness in a broader sense (Chong and Calderon 2000). 
 
This paper, building off of Hartwell (2016) and Hartwell et al. (2019), attempts to survey the current 
state of the literature regarding the institutions-resources-inequality nexus and offers a way forward for 
future research and policy. Our working hypothesis is that good political institutions, and in particular 
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democratic institutions, prevent extreme income polarization in a country blessed with natural resource 
endowments. Using cross-country data on natural resource rents, levels and changes in political 
institutions, and the evolution of income inequality, we show that there is no relationship between 
resource rents and inequality unless one takes into account political institutions. In particular, it appears 
that democracies tend to minimize resource-related inequality relative to more authoritarian states.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: we present a comprehensive survey of the literature in the following 
section, while Section 3 provides empirical evidence on the natural resources-inequality-democracy 
nexus. Concluding remarks, and a challenge for future research, are offered in our final section. 
 
II. Theory and Literature Review 
As noted above, the theory of linkages between natural resources and income inequality is ambiguous, 
with little clear-but predictions on how natural resources would impact longer-term trends. Early 
research into resources and inequality argued that, above all, a country’s economic structure matters, in 
particular its distribution of capital, labor, and productivity. Spilimbergo et al. (1999) typify this line of 
research, showing that land- and capital- intensive countries have a less equal income distribution, while 
skill-intensive countries have a more equal income distribution. Leamer et al. (1999) taking this work 
forward to develop a theory of resource impact on inequality, demonstrate how natural resources can 
attract scarce capital, resulting in less available investment for manufacturing and other high value-
added sectors required for development. Alvarez and Fuentes (2012) show evidence for this theory, 
finding that resource-rich countries are less likely to have comparative advantage in manufacturing 
goods than resource-scarce countries and also are more likely to lose comparative advantage if they 
attain it. By extension, the growth-impeding effects of resources lead to a lack of development and less 
ability to flatten the Gini curve. Allcot and Keniston (2018) provide contrary evidence from the US, 
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noting that oil and gas booms work to improve local wages without depressing manufacturing, putting 
these positive effects down to agglomeration. Cavalcanti et al. (2019) also argue that in Brazil, oil 
discoveries improve local development through urbanization and relocation of workers from agriculture 
to services. Finally, Goderis and Malone (2011), focusing instead on the labor market side, also show 
how the presence of a relatively unskilled labor intensive non-traded sector can see a brief decrease in 
inequality as unskilled workers are drawn into the resource sector, but stagnation and steadily 
increasing inequality over time as the initial effect of the resource discovery wears off.  
 
Implicit in this work, but rarely explicitly stated, is the role of institutions in affecting both the existing 
economic structure of a country and in mediating the flows of resources once they are discovered. 
Indeed, the channels through which resources must run to influence inequality necessarily include the 
“rules of the game,” encapsulated in its institutional make-up, as economic and political institutions can 
affect utilization and distribution of resources. Hartwell (2016) makes precisely this point in the context 
of materials use, showing how resource-rich countries tend to use resources in a less efficient manner 
but effective institutions (above all property rights) can mitigate against waste (Nunez-Rocha and Turcu 
[2019] also make a similar point regarding the interplay of democracy and effective environmental 
regulation). With regard to the broader issue of institutions and resource use as related to economic 
outcomes, Mehlum et al. (2006) make the strongest case for institutional influence, noting that quality 
institutions help to increase aggregate income up, while poor-quality institutions have the opposite 
effect.1 In line with this finding, Collier and Hoeffler (2009) provide a theoretical framework and show 
empirically that quality institutions, in particular strong government accountability, enhances economic 
                                                                 
1 Boschini et al. (2007) arrive to a similar conclusion and argue that the positive or negative impact of natural 
resources on economic growth depends not only on institutional quality, but also on the type of natural resources. 
If institutional quality is good, mineral-rich countries are less l ikely to suffer from the negative consequences of 
natural resources as compared to countries rich in diamonds and precious metals.  
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performance in resource-rich democracies.2 Sarmidi et al. (2014) extend this analysis to show that there 
is a threshold effect in institutional quality, with countries having institutional quality above this 
threshold contributing to economic growth but countries below it seeing deleterious consequences. 
 
An emerging stream of literature also focuses on the impact of natural resource discoveries on 
economic outcomes. Existing studies show that oil and minerals discoveries hinder long-run democratic 
development (Tsui 2011) but enhance long-run economic growth (Smith 2015) and reduce income 
inequality in developed countries (Hartwell et al. 2019).  Bhattacharyya et al. (2017) also suggest that in 
more democratic countries, oil and minerals discoveries lead to more fiscal autonomy at subnational 
level, while less democratic countries tend to centralize expenditures.  
 
The literature on the effects of institutions in resource-rich countries also runs in both directions, finding 
that not only do institutions affect the way in which resources are utilized but also that, over the longer-
term, the presence of resources can also shape institutional evolution. Isham et al. (2005), in a widely 
cited study, show how point-source resources contribute to poorer governance indicators, even while 
controlling for export structure, while diffuse source resources do not have the same effect. Mavrotas et 
al. (2011) formalize these results into a model of rent-seeking contests, also showing that point-source 
natural resource dependence has a direct effect on institutional development in both governance and 
democracy (Pomfret [2011] demonstrates this in Central Asia). A substantial body of literature also 
suggests that natural resources hinder democratic development (Barro 1999, Ross 2001, Aslaksen 2010, 
                                                                 
2 Libman (2013) extends this analysis for the case of Russian regions and shows that when institutions are efficient 
and non-corrupt, natural resource rents may enhance economic growth even in non-democracies. Also, Asiedu and 
Lien (2011) argue that democracy facil itates FDI in countries where the share of natural resources in total exports 
is low, but where exports are dominated by natural resource democracy can actually have a negative effect.  
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Tsui 2011).3 However, this does not necessarily lead to poor economic performance, and autocracies 
with good quality institutions may also have good economic performance (Collier and Hoeffler 2009, 
Libman 2013, Besley and Kudamatsu 2008). Taking a different approach, Fum and Holder (2010) detail 
how resources lead to higher stakes in ethnically heterogeneous societies, with ethnic divisions 
exacerbating inequality in the presence of resource discoveries; as Kyriacou (2013) notes, this is not a 
surprising result, as fractured societies also have poorer quality institutions. 
 
Of the myriad of institutions which could impact inequality, political institutions have a special role to 
play, as they should translate the desires of the populace for flatter income distributions into reality via 
redistributive mechanisms (Meltzer and Richard 1981; Gylfason and Zoega 2003; Islam 2016). In theory, 
the protection of the poorer members of society would be paramount for a democracy, and thus direct 
redistribution of resources (via taxation or the provision of public services) could occur (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2006; Acemoglu et al. 2019). There need not only be direct redistribution, however, and 
equality of opportunity and a focus on access to education (Ross 2006) would also result in improved 
human capital (Rodrik 1999), thus translating into less inequality (Muller 1988, Lake and Baum 2001). 
This channel could operate even in a country with high social mobility, where the ability to become rich 
leads most segments of society to favor less redistribution (believing that they themselves will one day 
be subject to it, see Alesina and La Ferrara 2005). In such an environment, support of access to human 
capital and preference for equal opportunities would accompany democratization and lead eventually to 
improved inequality outcomes (Gylfason 2001, Gallego 2010) and higher long-run economic growth 
                                                                 
3 In contrast, Haber and Menaldo (2011) suggest that resource rents are not associated with autocracy. Aslaksen 
and Torvik (2006) also provide a theoretical model and empirical evidence to show that high resource rents 
combined with low labor productivity increase the l ikelihood of civil  conflict, while high labor productivity makes 
democracy more l ikely.  
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(Acemoglu et al. 2019).4 Additionally, democracies facilitate the adoption of economic reforms 
conducive to growth (Acemoglu et al. 2019, Giuliano et al. 2013), and invest more in capital, schooling, 
and health (Acemoglu et al. 2019). These dimensions are also complementary to better economic 
outcomes.  
 
However, the existing evidence of the link between democracy and income inequality writ large is rather 
inconclusive, with little direct links between the institutions of democracy and lower inequality (see 
especially Balcazar (2016) in Latin America and Timmons (2010) and Knutsen (2015) for a global look). In 
some sense, this is related to the distribution of the factors of production pre-democratization, as highly 
unequal societies before democracy are likely to take a long time to become more equal. Some evidence 
for this was found by Huber and Stephens (2012) who, examining Latin America, noted that income 
inequality only began to decline after a period of both economic growth and extended democratization, 
with the length of time a country remained democratic correlated with lower levels of income 
inequality; as they conjecture, the longer that a country remains democratic, the more time there is for 
left-leaning parties to emerge, become legitimized, and enact redistributive policies (eroding traditional 
elites).5 Additionally, Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) also note that informal political institutions can 
subvert de jure political institutions, and thus the real power distribution within a country could 
determine inequality and who is allowed to ascend the ladder, i.e. unequal factor distributions could 
retard the effectiveness of democracy.  In this sense, perhaps it is the quality and coverage of 
democratic institutions which matter for inequality rather than their presence (Gupta et al. [2002] note 
as much by linking high levels of corruption to high income inequality). Caselli and Michaels (2013) also 
                                                                 
4 Acemoglu et al. (2019) argue that in the long-run, democratization leads to 20% increase in GDP per capita. 
Eberhardt (2019) reassesses this finding and suggests that the impact of democracy is more conservative though 
sti l l  sizeable (about 10%).  
5 Gerring et al. (2012) also posit that the amount of time under democracy matters for other human development 
indicators, suggesting that established democracies are better able to handle issues of social protection rather 
than new ones. 
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show indirectly that poorer-quality democratic institutions, while channeling funds from resource 
windfalls to greater spending, also have a gap in the actual flow of goods, services, and transfers to the 
population versus the reported spending increases accompanying from the windfall. Similarly, Cockx and 
Francken (2016) show that education spending actually does not increase more in resource-rich 
countries. To end on a more sanguine note, however, in their examination of transition economies, 
Gradstein and Milanovic (2004) note that income inequality spiked with democratization, a more 
welcome outcome (perhaps not for them) in that it resulted from the ability of entrepreneurs to achieve 
wealth without reliance on the state (Atkinson and Micklewright 1992).6 
 
Given that the direct linkages between democracy and inequality are not always clear, it is worthwhile 
to explore how democracy might mitigate inequality in resource-rich economies. Indeed, we believe 
that the inclusion of democracy is the final piece of the puzzle in the institutions-resources-inequality 
nexus: if institutions can mitigate the resource curse and if democracy can have an impact on inequality, 
then the presence of a democracy in a country which discovers resources can use those resources to 
mitigate income inequality.  In particular, we propose that the influence of democracy would operate 
through three distinct channels: 
 
1. Executive constraints: Established democracies have a broader number of checks and balances 
and allow for a larger number of veto players, thus preventing the concentration of political 
power. With political power more diffuse, there is less likelihood for economic actors to gain 
political control of resource flows (Bhattacharyya and Hodler 2010) and/or political actors to 
control resource rents for their own gain (Robinson et al. 2006; Bulte and Damania 2008). Thus, 
                                                                 
6 Of course, in some transition countries such as Ukraine and Russia, the drivers of economic inequality were 
precisely a reliance on the state, as tentative moves towards democracy were accompanied by rent capture by 




we would expect to see countries with both democratic political institutions and natural 
resources to have less inequality than non-democratic regimes (consistent with Goderis and 
Malone 2011); 
 
2. Equitable sharing: Beyond limiting the power of politicians to aggrandize economic rents, 
democracies, by voting for social programs, may also tend to spread the resource wealth more 
than authoritarian regimes (Boix 2003, Ross 2006). In the context of natural resources, 
democratic countries are better are using the spoils of these endowments to smooth 
inequalities (Auty 2000). Moreover, the presence of resources makes the act of voting more 
valuable, thus drawing more actors into the political arena and acting as a check on each other 
(as a corollary to point 1 above). 
 
3. Utilization of opportunities: Finally, given the diffusion of power which democracy enables and 
the social spending it encourages, democracy also encourages citizens to maximize their own 
potential and invest to improve their human capital. In this environment, the presence of 
natural resources can be a boon (Cabrales and Hauk 2010), providing funding to improve 
education and thus also increasing income mobility. In contrast to authoritarian regimes, which 
may also target human capital rents but only narrowly at elites, democracies should enlarge the 
space of opportunities available at all levels (Saint-Paul and Verdier 1996). 
 
While each of these avenues is theoretically plausible, to our knowledge there is no study which exists 
that takes into account explicitly the linkages between democracy, resources, and inequality. Our next 




III. The Evidence 
This section provides new evidence on the natural resources – democracy – inequality nexus. We have 
collected relevant cross-country data on natural resource rents, income inequality and democracy and 
have created both visual and econometric evidence for the existence of the relationships amongst these 
variables. 
 
In the first instance, in order to understand the extent of natural resource abundance in a country, we 
utilize World Bank data on natural resource rents to gross domestic product (GDP) as a proxy for 
resource dependence. Total natural resource rents are calculated as the sum of oil rents, natural gas 
rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents. The benefit of the natural resource 
rents ratio is that it has reasonable country and time coverage available annually; to capture long-term 
trends in resource dependence, we take the average of this variable over 1980 to 2009.  
 
Turning to our inequality data, in order to proxy for inequality in income, we utilize data from Solt 
(2016). The Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) is the most comprehensive source 
on income inequality, and we use the Gini index derived from this database (version 8) based on the 
distribution of pre-tax income in order to assess the degree of income inequality. 7 Additionally, we take 
the average of the Gini coefficient between 2010 and 2016 to eliminate potential one-off shocks. 
 
                                                                 
7 The issue of income inequality data comparabil ity and coverage has been extensively discussed in the l iterature 
(Atkinson and Brandolini 2001 and 2009, Jenkins 2015, Solt 2016). Earlier versions of the SWIID database have also 
been criticized for imperfect imputation of missing data (Jenkins 2015). However, as detailed in Solt (2015) and 
(2016), starting from the version 5.0 (October 2014), the SWIID data took into account the earlier critiques and 
were substantially updated. A comprehensive documentation regarding the SWIID methodology is provided in Solt 
(2016). To date, the SWIID database remains the most comprehensive source on income inequality data 
comparable across countries (Solt 2016). 
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Finally, we use the democratic accountability score from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
dataset, originally scaled from 0 to 6 with higher numbers signaling higher levels of representation and 
checks and balances but re-scaled in our database from 0 to 1 for ease of interpretation. There are more 
databases providing an assessment of the degree of democracy in a given country, but the ICRG 
database has the most extensive coverage (and democracy scores from different databases are typically 
highly correlated as well). A drawback of the ICRG democracy indicator is that it does not allow us 
specifically to disentangle the channels via which democracy may be influencing inequality (as shown 
above), in that it focuses on the broader idea of democratic accountability, i.e. the responsiveness of a 
government to its citizens. While this should encompass the theoretical links noted above, it is possible 
that it misses some of the other channels through which democracy may operate, including 
expenditures on human capital and/or health. Nonetheless, we feel that this indicator is most 
appropriate for gauging the level of democracy within a country. 
 
To examine the differential effect of natural resources on income inequality, we distinguish in our 
sample among the least and the most democratic countries. We assume that the least democratic 
countries in our global sample are those with the democratic accountability score below the 25% 
percentile. Similarly, we consider the most democratic countries as those with the score above the 75% 
percentile.8 Alternatively, we also use the measure of institutional quality (computed as the average of 
three constituent indicators, namely corruption, bureaucratic quality, and law and order) from the 
International Country Risk Guide dataset and find that our results presented below are robust to 
replacing democratic accountability with institutional quality. This result is not so surprising given that 
the correlation between democratic accountability and institutional quality is 0.81 in our sample (and 
                                                                 
8 We are aware that these cut-off points are somewhat arbitrary, but further robustness tests conducted after our 
examination show that the results are unaffected even if we change the cut-off points upwards or downwards. 
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theoretically, there are many overlaps between an institutional matrix which is accountable to veto 
players and one which is perceived to be less corrupt and have more respect for rule of law).  
 
Natural Resources and Income Inequality 
The first evidence we have of the relationships between natural resources and income inequality is, as 
noted above, presented graphically in Figure 1, a scatter plot based on observations from 122 countries. 
Contrary to previous literature, we find that the link between natural resources and income inequality is 
essentially zero in our global sample (a fact also confirmed by the correlation coefficient of -0.02).  It is 
important to note that our examination uses the lags of natural resources rents, based on the period 
1980-2009, done so to reduce endogeneity concerns, while income inequality is based on more recent 
data (the average taken over 2010-2016); however, given that the effects of resources on income should 
not be contemporaneous, the lack of any relationship in this examination seems definitive. 
 
This relationship appears to change when we introduce the issue of institutional efficacy, namely 
democracy, into the picture. Indeed, examining the link between natural resources and income 
inequality for the most and least democratic countries (Figure 2), we observe that a systematic pattern 
between resources and inequality emerges. The left part of Figure 2 shows the scatter plot for the least 
democratic countries, while the right part shows it for the most democratic countries. We observe that 
income inequality appears to be, on average, higher in resource-rich countries when the level of 
democracy in the countries in our set is low (an example of such countries includes Angola, Congo, and 
Sudan), with a corresponding correlation coefficient of 0.16. On the other hand, democratic countries 
such as Australia, Canada, or Norway exhibit a lower degree of income inequality where they have 
abundant natural resources, as shown in the second panel of Figure 2, with a corresponding correlation 
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coefficient of -0.12. These results suggest that democratic countries redistribute the part of natural 
resource revenues to the society, exactly as the theory predicts.  
Figure 1 – Natural Resource Rents and Income Inequality: All Countries 
 
 
Note: Natural resource rents to GDP – World Bank Dataset. Total natural resource rents are the sum of oil  rents, 
natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents. Average 1980-2009. Income Inequality 
– Gini index based on the distribution of pre-tax income (The Standardized World Income Inequality Database), 
average 2010-2016, Solt (2016).  
Figure 2 – Natural Resource Rents and Income Inequality: Democracy Matters 






Note: Rents and income inequality as above.  The least democratic countries defined as those with the democratic 
accountabil ity score from ICRG dataset below the 25th percentile. The most democratic countries defined as those 
with the democratic accountabil ity score from ICRG dataset above the 75th percentile. 
 
Natural Resources, Democracy and Inequality: Regression Analysis 
This analysis, while providing some evidence for the impact of democracy on the natural resources-
inequality nexus, is based mainly on correlations. In order to complement this evidence on the effect in 
a more rigorous manner, we use a reduced-form model to further tease out the effects of democracy. 
We use a cross-sectional global dataset as noted above, regressing income inequality on a series of 
lagged explanatory variables (the explanatory variables are lagged again to, in principle, address 
potential concerns about endogeneity). We estimate the following equation using ordinary least squares 
(OLS): 
 
IncIneqj = a0 + a1*NatResj + a2*NatResj*Democrj + ai*Xj + ej     (1) 
 
Where IncIneq represents the measure of income inequality in country j, NatRes captures the natural 
resource rents, Democr denotes the level of democratic accountability, X is a matrix of control variables, 
and e represents the error term. The data definitions and the sources are available in Table A.1 in the 
Appendix, while descriptive statistics are available in Table A.2. 
 
We motivate the specification of our regression model by previous evidence on the cross-country 
determinants of income inequality. Importantly, we include the level of generalized trust, as Uslaner 
(2009) extensively showed that trust is strongly linked to inequality. Additionally, we control for several 
variables capturing the level of economic development, education, financial development, demography, 
labor market flexibility, technological progress, and political stability. This choice can be rationalized by 
previous research on the determinants of income inequality (Roine et al. [2009] and Tridico [2018] and 
16 
 
references therein). For example, Claessens and Perotti (2007) also provide a survey of how financial 
development can affect income inequality and show that it can both increase or decrease inequality 
depending on the characteristics of financial development. Along these lines, Pastor and Veronesi (2016) 
develop a theoretical model of asset price formation, which, among other results, implies that skill 
heterogeneity (which is often linked to technological progress) causes inequality. Similar arguments on 
how technological progress affects the skill premium and subsequently income inequality are also raised 
by Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) and Milanovic (2016). Bircan et al. (2017) show how political instability and 
conflicts translate into greater income inequality, while Tridico (2018) finds that greater labor market 
flexibility has been associated with greater inequality in the OECD countries. Scheidel (2017) argues that 
the effects of education on inequality are not clear-cut; on the one hand, education can lower the gap 
between rich and poor but on the other hand, elite school systems and assortative mating may 
propagate inequality across generations. 
Table 1 – What Determines Income Inequality? Regression Analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Natural resource 0.55* 0.53* 0.54** 0.51* 0.61** 0.55* 
 (0.28) (0.27) (0.27) (0.26) (0.28) (0.32) 
Nat. Res.*Democracy -1.53** -1.61** -1.58** -1.53** -1.73** -1.57** 
 (0.64) (0.64) (0.63) (0.61) (0.67) (0.71) 
Trust -8.99** -6.81* -8.18* -7.96 -7.73 -10.00* 
 (4.18) (4.28) (4.97) (5.19) (5.41) (5.85) 
Education expenditures 0.70* 0.77* 0.65* 0.65** 0.66** 0.70** 
 (0.32) (0.31) (0.34) (0.29) (0.29) (0.32) 
Revolutions and coups 0.49** 0.48** 0.50** 0.52** 0.56** 0.59** 
 (0.21) (0.20) (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) 
Life expectancy  -0.11 -0.23 -0.22 -0.25 -0.32 
  (0.11) (0.24) (0.23) (0.24) (0.27) 
Technological progress   2.08 2.02 -0.92 -0.46 
   (2.84) (2.72) (4.19) (4.30) 
Labor market regulations   -2.11 -1.99 -1.86 
    (1.31) (1.33) (1.29) 
GDP p.c.     2.32 2.39 
     (1.99) (1.99) 
Net interest margin      -0.29 
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      (0.42) 
R-squared 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.24 0.25 0.26 
No. of observations 78 78 76 76 75 75 
Note: Robust standard errors. *,**,*** - denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. Constant not reported. 
 
Our regression results are available in Table 1. We find that higher natural resource rents are indeed 
associated with greater income inequality unless the level of democracy is high, and for democratic 
countries, we find the opposite effect, i.e. natural resources are associated with less inequality. This 
result confirms the graphic/correlation analysis of the previous subsection and also is in line with our 
theoretical supposition that natural resource curse (in terms of high inequality) is not inevitable. 9  
 
Several control variables are statistically significant as well, with their effects largely in line with the 
studies mentioned in the previous paragraph. We find that generalized trust lowers inequality, but 
education expenditures and political instability tend to increase inequality. Greater labor market 
regulations tend to decrease inequality, but this effect is not statistically significant in our sample. 
Similarly, we fail to find that technological progress, life expectancy, financial development, and level of 
economic development as the drivers of income inequality in our sample. Further research may examine 
to what extent these results hold, if we use different proxies for these factors.  
 
Natural resource discoveries and income inequality in three European democracies 
As a final attempt to shed light on the relationship between natural resources, income inequality, and 
political institutions, we utilize the synthetic control method by Abadie et al. (2010) to assess the 
                                                                 
9 According to our results, an average level of democracy with an average level of natural resource abundance 
reduces inequality. Within the average level of natural resource abundance, the turning point for democracy vis a 
vis inequality is a score of 0.36, which is, for example, Uganda or Vietnam in our sample. Thus, our results suggest 
that countries with a democracy score above 0.36 will  be better situated to util ize natural resource discoveries to 
lower income inequality.  However, given that this is a first attempt at exploring this relationship, we do not want 
to overemphasize the precision of the estimated coefficients and are more interested in the average effects. 
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consequences of a natural resource shock (i.e. a resource discovery) on income inequality.  The synthetic 
control method builds on the difference-in-differences estimator and allows a researcher to calculate 
the counterfactual of what income inequality would be if natural resources had not been discovered 
(hence the usage of a resource discovery rather than reliance on resources); the actual level of income 
inequality can then be compared to its counterfactual values and the shock interpreted as a causal 
mechanism.   
 
In this section, we focus on three highly developed European countries with well-functioning democratic 
institutions (in this case, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway) rather than countries across the 
political spectrum. This choice is motivated by two points, one theoretical and one practical. 
Theoretically, using high-functioning democracies allows us to assess further whether natural resources 
can help to reduce inequality in democratic societies via the channels noted above.  At a practical level, 
data availability is also somewhat restricted, as natural resource discoveries concentrate in the 1960s-
1980s, which is also the period for which the reliable income inequality data are typically available only 
for high-income countries. The data availability issues also dictate that we use the 1% and 10% income 
share as the measure of income inequality rather that the Gini coefficient.  
 
The long-run evolution of the 1%- and 10%-income shares in the three analyzed countries also has a 
number of similarities. First, all three countries present a successful example of combining well-
functioning institutions with declining income inequality (Aaberge and Atkinson 2010; Atkinson and 
Søgaard 2016; de Meere 1983;  Soltow and van Zanden 1998; Van Bavel and Frankema 2017). Also, all 
three countries experienced declining income inequality, as measured by top 1% and top 10% income 
shares, over a similar time-frame, namely after industrialization in the end of 19th and beginning of the 
20th century, post-World War II, and in the last decades of the 20th century (see Atkinson and Søgaard 
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2016 on trends in Denmark, Aaberge and Atkinson 2010 on trends in Norway, and de Meere 1983; 
Soltow and van Zanden 1998; and Van Bavel and Frankema 2017 for the Netherlands). In line with 
Piketty et al. (2014) and Alvaredo et al. (2013), Atkinson and Søgaard (2016) note that such long-run 
trends do not merely reflect labor market responses to redistributive policies developments in those 
countries.  
 
The econometric method, data, timing of natural resources discoveries, and individual country results 
are described in detail in Hartwell et al. (2019). In this article, we follow Cavallo et al. (2013) and present 
the average effect of natural resource discoveries on income inequality, where the average is taken 
across our three countries. For each country, we normalize the year of natural resource discovery as 
year zero and the level of income inequality in the year of natural resource discovery to the level of one.  
 
Figure 3 – Natural Resource Discoveries and Top 1% Share Income Inequality:  




Note: Actual and counterfactual path of income inequality 20 years before and after the natural resource 
discovery. Path shown is the average across Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway. The income inequality 
measure is normalized to 1 in the year 0 (i .e. the year of natural resource discovery). 
 
We present the results for the top 1% income share in Figure 3, shown as the evolution of income 
inequality both 20 years before and after the natural resource discovery. We find that the synthetic 
income inequality (labelled in Figure 3 as the counterfactual) is approximately 10-25% higher than its 
actual counterpart. The results further support our baseline findings that natural resources need not 
translate into greater inequality in democratic societies. According to our results (and as Hartwell et al. 
(2019) suggest), natural resource discoveries in these countries causally affected income inequality 
dynamics. We observe similar results for the top 10% income share (Figure 4). While counterfactual 
inequality stagnates or increases somewhat, actual income inequality falls following the natural 
resource discovery. 
 




Actual vs. Counterfactual 
 
Note: Actual and counterfactual path of income inequality 20 years before and after the natural resource 
discovery. Path shown is the average across Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway. The income inequality 
measure is normalized to 1 in the year 0 (i .e. the year of natural resource discovery). 
 
 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
Far from being the definitive word in the relationship between political institutions and natural 
resources, this paper is instead intended as an opening salvo, a survey of the existing landscape on this 
nexus and a way to spark more research and debate. In particular, we provide a survey of the literature 
and theory on how political institutions would interact with natural resources and income inequality, 
complementing this survey with empirical evidence showing the non-linear effect of natural resources 
on income inequality. As a result of this examination, we find that natural resources increase income 
inequality only in non-democratic countries, while democratic institutions appear to be effective at 




resource discoveries via the synthetic control method, we also show how the actual evolution of the 
path of inequality in highly-developed democracies is significantly lower after a resource discovery than 
would be predicted by the synthetic counterfactual. 
 
Given that this is merely a first attempt to examine the link between democracy and inequality in the 
face of resources, in terms of future research, the possibilities are very open indeed. In the first instance, 
more rigorous modelling, extended further back than the data currently allows, would be welcome, 
especially if the modelling could be matched to a formal model of the interplay between resources, 
democracy, and inequality. Secondly, utilization of various metrics of income inequality, and especially a 
comparison of these metrics in relation to institutional features, would be a valid extension of this work: 
do some metrics of inequality show different effects in the presence of democracy and resources? Or 
are all metrics showing the same effect?  
 
Along these lines, democracies are not all created equal, and exciting research has been done in recent 
years in exploring the “varieties of democracy,” encapsulated in the V-Dem project at the Department of 
Political Science at the University of Gothenburg.10 While we use aggregated indices for democracy in 
this paper, perhaps breaking out the various varieties of democracy would yield more useful insights in 
understanding how democracy mediates against inequality and the resources curse. Similarly, perhaps a 
more precise delineation of democratic processes, such as those found in the Max Range dataset on 
political institutions (Rånge and Sandberg 2017), could also help us to understand the exact channels via 
which political regimes influence inequality. As an extension of the work we do here, it also could be 
important to more precisely pinpoint the level of democracy at which natural resource discoveries 
                                                                 
10 See their website at https://www.v-dem.net/en/.  
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become beneficial for alleviating income inequality (or which facet of democracy needs to develop the 
most for this to occur). 
 
We also believe it would be worthwhile to explore not only the effect of natural resources on income 
inequality but also on wealth inequality. Unfortunately, the limited data on wealth inequality makes it 
difficult at the moment to conduct a broad panel data analysis, but researchers should take up this 
challenge to also attempt to fashion excellent metrics of wealth inequality with both good coverage and 
a longer time-series. Moreover, the determinants of wealth inequality are largely unexplored, and 
natural resources may be one of contributing factors driving wealth inequality, especially in resource-
rich countries. Will the effects of natural resources on wealth inequality be identical to the effects on 
income inequality? Will democratic institutions shape the links between natural resources and wealth 
inequality?  
 
As noted, the possibilities are wide open for continuing to explore these relationships, and we hope that 
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Table A.1 - Data definitions and sources 
Income inequality Pre-tax income – Gini coefficient. Average 2010-2016. Solt (2016) - The 
Standardized World Income Inequality Database 
Natural resource rents Total natural resource rents are the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, 
coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents. Average 1980-
2009. World Bank. 
Democratic 
accountability 
Responsiveness of government is to its citizens. International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG). 2009. 
Education expenditures The current operating expenditures in education, including wages and 
salaries and excluding capital investments in buildings and equipment. 
Average 1980-2009. World Bank. 
Life expectancy Life expectancy at birth as of 1990. World Bank. 
Labor market regulations LAMRIG. Rigidity of employment protection legislation. Campos and 
Nugent (2012). 
Technological progress The index of technological development from CHAT dataset. Comin and 
Hobijn (2009). 
Net interest margin Accounting value of banks’ net interest revenue as a share of average 
interest-bearing assets. World Bank. 
GDP per capita GDP level per capita in 1990. World Bank. 
Trust Generalized trust. 2005-2009.  World Values Survey Data.  
Revolutions and coups Revolutions and coups, total instances between 1950 and 2009. Powell 
and Thyne (2011). 
 
Table A.2 – Descriptive Statistics 
 
Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max 
Income inequality 44.11 44.04 7.13 26.89 66.09 
Natural resource rents 7.42 2.74 10.54 0 47.79 
Democratic accountability 0.65 0.66 0.25 0.05 1 
Education expenditures 4.04 3.86 1.97 0.99 15.14 
Life expectancy 64.77 68.3 10.06 34.21 78.83 
Labor market regulations 1.58 1.62 0.48 0.46 2.79 
Technological progress -0.01 0.14 0.79 -1.69 1.29 
Net interest margin 5.11 4.76 2.83 0.66 12.81 
GDP per capita 8.61 8.68 1.2 6.23 11.6 
Trust 0.25 0.22 0.14 0.04 0.69 





Countries included in the regressions: 
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina 
Faso, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, 
Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Hungary, Chile, China, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea South, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, 
Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Russia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United 
States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
